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Abstract Any discipline of human knowledge is charac-
terized by three fundamental elements: the complexity of
its content, the method used for its elaboration, and the
language used for its expression. This article argues that
any method for making knowledge is a particular combi-
nation of three main components that we can call
(a) science, (b) art, and (c) revelation. The right combina-
tion depends on the complexity of the slice of reality that
we wish to understand in each case. Is there a relationship
between the quantity and quality of a particular piece of
knowledge and the quantity and quality of its eventual
audience? Such a relationship serves, I believe, to avoid
certain old misunderstandings.
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Introduction
There is, one might say, an unwritten conservation law that
combines the concepts of quantity and quality in relation to
human knowledge: the greater the quantity, the lower the
quality. Before we go on to define these supposedly con-
flicting concepts with a degree of rigor, there are a number
of observations to be made that seem beyond doubt. For
example, Mozart, Bach, Beethoven, and Stravinsky have
never been top of the record charts; the lists of best-selling
books are crammed with self-help books, as the idea of the
best seller in no way resembles a book of poems by
Leopardi; and cultural producers and agents choose stimuli
more on the basis of the level of consumption rather than
their intrinsic value. It is as if quantity as a concept were
opposed to that of quality, or at least not entirely com-
patible with it. It may also be that this is all the conse-
quence of a colossal and ancient misunderstanding.
In this article, we will take as our starting point the lan-
guage of mathematics to offer two definitions of the concepts
of quantity and quality in relation to knowledge. To do this,
we will base ourselves on two fundamental ideas: classes of
equivalence and classes of order. We will then go on to
propose a classification of any class of knowledge according
to two basic criteria: one based on themethod for obtaining it
and the other based on the language used. This approach
invites us to distinguish between two classes of universality
of every type of knowledge: the universality of its viability as
an object (the universality of its content) and the universality
of its viability as a subject (the universality of its audience).
Classes of Order and Classes of Equivalence
The different families of numbers—natural numbers, inte-
gers, rational, real, complex, and other number sets—were
invented to evaluate or measure quantities. Natural num-
bers (1, 2, 3, and so on) count and order while making the
quality of the concepts abstract. A shepherd who only owns
three sheep has no need of abstraction in order to know if
one is missing when the sun comes up. He knows them all
and he identifies them all by name–Teresa, Jane, and Dolly,
for example. He does not even need to know that there are
three of them. But if he has 648, then it is better for him to
count them and know how many he has. He does not even
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need to know what they are called or what they look like.
What do a sheep, a black sheep, a white sheep, a cloud, a
tree, a planet, or a depression have in common? The
number one! Natural numbers count and order with
abstraction other qualities that can be remembered. And so
sets of numbers are enlarged to include the set of integers
(…-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3,…) on either side of a reference
point (zero) but which do not divide or distribute; rational
numbers (…–1/2, 1/3, 1/8, 22/7,…), which do divide and
distribute but which do not serve to calculate the quotient
between the perimeter or the diameter of a circumference or
the square root of two; real numbers which also calculate
geometrical or algebraic ratios (such as p or
p
2) but which
cannot calculate everything such as the square root of a
negative number; and complex numbers, which can extend
even more the solution of many problems.
In fact, natural numbers are all that is required to measure
and order quantities (to measure in general any real mag-
nitude). Strictly speaking, we can term anything that can be
represented by a natural number a ‘‘quantity.’’ This occurs
when a collection of objects (a, b, c, and so on) admits a
relation R between them that fulfills three simple properties,
the reflexive, the transitive and the antisymmetric:
aRa Reflexive
aRb; bRc ) aRc Transitive
aRb; bRa ) a ¼ a Antisymmetric
ð1Þ
for any a, b, c in the group (Brown 2006).
This relation, the relation of order, is what makes one of
the important operations of human knowledge possible:
comparing. Two objects related by an order relation R
represent quantities that can be compared with each other
(a is smaller than b, a is larger than b, or a is equal to b).
When we talk of qualities, it is curious that we tend to
do the same thing; in other words, we also have the need to
compare (this has a higher, lower, or equal quality as). How
does one define the quantity of a quality? What is clear is
that classes of order are not sufficient to compare qualities.
The definition of quality requires the prior definition of the
class concept and of the so-called classes of equivalence.
An R relation in a collection of objects (a, b, c, etc.) defines
a class of equivalence if it fulfills three properties, the re-
flexive, the transitive and the symmetric:
aRa Reflexive
aRb; bRc ) aRc Transitive
aRb ) bRa Symmetric
ð2Þ
whatever the three a, b, c elements in the collection are
(Brown 2006). In other words: two objects are of the same
class of equivalence (or are equivalent or, if you like, are
comparable) if there is an equivalence relation R between
them. The most important consequence of a division of a
collection into classes of equivalence lies in the fact that
every object belongs to a class, and there is no object that
belongs to two classes at the same time. This is the perfect
classification, like Mendeleev’s periodic table or Linnaeus’
classification of species of living things. This mathematical
structure makes the first relation (with a certain, not trivial
sense) between quantity and quality possible. Let us sup-
pose that a collection of n objects makes it possible to
define two relations, one of order and the other of equiv-
alence. In this case, we have the possibility of a double
comparison: one of quantities between the objects thanks to
the relation of order; and the other a comparison between
the elements in a single class thanks to the relation of
equivalence. The relation of order introduces a criterion of
quantity (weights, for example: objects of equal weight
belong to the same class of order; or age, for example:
elements of equal age belong to the same class of order) so
that each class of equivalence, defined with the same set of
elements, has also an assigned quantity: the sum of the
quantities of the elements that belong to it (i.e., the sum of
weights or of ages). In other words, a classification of order
permits degrees in the comparison between objects
according to one criterion. In a classification of equiva-
lence, the comparison between two objects is limited to
determining whether they are or are not of the same class.
In any event, the distribution of quantities by classes has
a measure, a measure that combines quantities and quali-
ties. This is the well-known Shannon entropy, which
measures the diversity of occupation of a classification, be
it of order or equivalence, according to the distribution of a




pðiÞ lg2 p ið Þ bits=object ð3Þ
where p(i) = n(i)/N and where n(i) is the quantity of
objects of quality i and where N ¼Pni¼1 nðiÞ is the total
quantity of objects in the collection and n the total number
of different classes. Shannon entropy is a number between
0 and the lg2n that measures how the quantity is distributed
among the quality. The lower limit corresponds to mini-
mum diversity (all the objects in the same class) and the
upper limit to a uniform distribution of all the objects
among all the possible qualities.
In mathematical information theory in general and in
statistical mechanics in particular, entropy is used to cal-
culate the most probable structure of a system with all the
information available in each case. The idea is to maximize
entropy in known conditions. This is known as MaxEnt
(maximum entropy formalism (Jaynes 2003)) and is a
generalization of the famous second law of thermody-
namics. It is a powerful and universal method that enables
us to make the best possible prediction using all the
information available in each case. Using this method,
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strong parallels have been found between questions as
disparate as statistical mechanics (Jaynes 1957), marine
ecosystems (Lurie´ and Wagensberg 1983), fractal struc-
tures in mathematics (Pastor-Satorras and Wagensberg
1998), and Zipf’s law in linguistics (Mandelbrot 1965). It
is, then, the basis of what we could call a theory of com-
plexity according to which similar behaviors can be
deduced in systems that bear no relation to each other
except in one thing: they are complex systems. Accord-
ingly, we can refer to entropy as quantitative measure of
quality. We will now go on to apply these ideas to the
notion of the quantity and quality of human knowledge.
Firstly, however, we will briefly attempt to define what it is
that we term human knowledge.
The Entropy of Knowledge
Knowledge is packaged thinking capable of leaving one
mind and reaching another one after traversing the reality of
the world. The thought that cannot be communicated from
one mind to another will never be knowledge. The thought
may in principle be presumably infinite (an undefined
number of nuances are needed to determine it); knowledge,
however, is necessarily finite to enable it, duly packaged, to
traverse reality and reach another mind, where it is decoded.
A poem, a gesture, a musical score, a scientific theory, a
painting, or a sculpture necessarily begin and end; they have
their limits in both time and space. Accordingly, thinking
that aspires to be knowledge necessarily requires a reduction.
And this leads us to the first notion of quality, because the
knowledgewill be of one quality or another depending on the
method used for this reduction.
A recent paper (Wagensberg 2014b) suggested what the
scientific method consists of. Science is maximally objec-
tive, intelligible, and dialectic knowledge. Thanks to
objectivity, science is maximally universal vis-a`-vis both the
object (a pear falls just as an apple does) and the subject (the
apple falls for any observer at any time and in any place);
thanks to intelligibility, science maximally anticipates vis-a`-
vis time and space (an issue of evident interest for survival);
and thanks to its dialectical nature, science necessarily pro-
gresses, that is to say, it acquires new knowledge. However,
the more complex the content, the shorter the distance you
can go with scientific method. We can, then, try another
method, that of the communicability of complexities,
including those that are unintelligible. This is the method of
art. A work of art could be defined in the following way
(Wagensberg 2014a, p.27; my translation):
An artwork is a finite piece of reality that distorts an
experience of the world to induce in another mind, or
in one’s own, an extension of such experience.
More than 30,000 years of history of the human condition
vouch for the fact that this method works where science
declares itself to be impotent (at least for the moment). A
loving passion full of complex nuances cannot perhaps be
conveyed scientifically, but it can with a poem, a song, or a
simple smile. However, artistic knowledge also has its
limitations and for many citizens it is inadequate for
conveying some thoughts between mind and mind (though
both minds be the same mind). We can, then, turn to a third
and final method that will cover any complexity that might
still remain without cognitive treatment. This is revealed
knowledge, which consists of a single principle:
The revealed method consists of accepting under-
standing of a complexity of the world simply because
an entity that we do not question reveals it to us, be
this a deity, consciousness, or simple intuition.
It is clear that quantum physics is a primarily scientific
discipline, that painting is a primarily artistic discipline,
and that a religion, such as Christianity or Judaism, is a
primarily revealed discipline. But none of them is entirely
pure as regards their method. There is no physics without
an intuition of certain ideas even though scientific method
is later applied (the method serves to work on ideas but not
to capture them); nor is there any doubt that there can be no
art without a certain minimal dose of objectivity and
intelligibility; and nor is there a belief that does not seek or
use a minimum measure of rationality. Even to mention a
miracle perforce involves demonstration that it is not
natural. It can perhaps be briefly stated that:
1. Theoretically, there are only three different possible
methods for creating knowledge about the reality of
the world: the scientific method, the artistic method,
and the revealed method.
2. No method is pure in the practice of creating new
knowledge but rather a weighted blend of the three
different possible methods.
In the terminology of the previous paragraph, real disci-
plines of human knowledge do not form a division into
classes of equivalence (scientific, artistic, or revealed)
because no knowledge is purely scientific (without
revealed or artistic ingredients), purely artistic (without
scientific or revealed components), or purely revealed
(without a trace of science or art). This intuition can be
explained starting from the fundamental principles that we
used to define the scientific method.
Let us consider firstly the principle of objectivity. For
this, we start with a drastic and unequal division of the
world: me and the rest of reality or, if you prefer, the
subject and object of knowledge, or the mind that creates
knowledge (the mind capable of observing and under-
standing) and the slice of reality to be observed and
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understood. Science, as we understand it today (Wagens-
berg 2014b), is based on this separation of concepts. At its
limit of maximum viability, objectivity occurs when the
observation of the world by the mind is achieved without
altering in the slightest the observation itself, that is to say,
without the observed or the observer being altered by it. In
this extreme situation, the principle of objectivity is applied
100 % with all its force. The observation of the movement
of a billiard ball does not affect the physical state of the
ball nor the state of the onlooker. The extreme opposite of
this is the case of a mind attempting to study an object of
similar complexity, for example, when it is attempting to
understand another mind or when it is attempting to study
itself. In this case, it is impossible to prevent the process of
observation being affected, though the scientist will always
attempt to ensure that the influence is minimal to safeguard
to the maximum the degree of universality of the knowl-
edge achieved. We assign a coefficient ß0 between zero and
one to represent the maximum degree of objectivity
achievable in a case of a particular level of complexity.
What happens to the scientific shortfall resulting from such
a shortfall in objectivity? We can follow a similar line of
reasoning when talking about intelligibility. If we accept
that the degree of scientific understanding matches the
minimum expression of the maximum that is shared, we
can also introduce a coefficient ßi to state the degree of
compression (and hence also of comprehension) possible in
each case. What happens now to the scientific shortfall
resulting from such a shortfall in intelligibility? And
something similar can be introduced with a possible
dialectic coefficient depending on the degree of difficulty
we might encounter when guaranteeing the fact that reality
can manage to refute our conclusions. We will recognize
this dialectic coefficient as ßd. What happens to the sci-
entific shortfall overcome by a possible dialectic shortfall?
We can attempt to answer the three questions together
because all three stem from the separation of the subject
from the object. Let us put ourselves in the situation in
which the subject does not attain his maximum objectivity,
intelligibility, or dialectic capacity in relation to the object.
Let us suppose that the tendency of the mind is to make up
for such shortcomings. What can the subject do to make up
for that part of the object that infiltrates inseparably into
himself? What can the subject do to replace part of the
understanding that he finds himself incapable of continuing
to compress to its maximum degree? What can the subject
do with that understanding that shows itself to be immune
to everything that can occur in reality?
There is just one possible answer. The subject must
give up the idea that she (the subject) is a necessary and
sufficient entity to create objective, intelligible, and
dialectic knowledge and accept help from some other
class of entity. What should we call that entity capable of
taking on the subject’s tasks, in other words, of giving the
subject what she needs because her objectivity, intelligi-
bility, and dialectic is not enough for her to attain it by
herself? In the first instance, we can call this entity simply
intuition, that is, the intuition of the subject’s own con-
sciousness. Intuition can be defined as the result of the
subject’s experience of the reality of the world, a slight
touch between what has already been observed and what
has not as yet been observed, a slight friction between
what has already been understood and what is not yet
understood, a slight graze between the rebuttal already
imagined and the rebuttal as yet not imagined. There
where the subject cannot go with her objectivity, intelli-
gibility, and dialect, she can with the intuition of her
consciousness. The scientific method has made use of
another method that we could term the artistic method, a
method that only has one principle, which is to address
the subject’s intuition when the object becomes so com-
plex that the scientific method reaches its limits. By way
of a metaphor, we could define a pair of coefficients
between zero and one that we will designate as lc and la
respectively for science and art in order to communicate,
also metaphorically, the proportions of science and art
involved in a particular piece of knowledge.
Just as science eventually reaches its own limits, so too
does the artistic approach. How then can the creation of
knowledge continue when the intuition of the subject’s
own consciousness can do no more? Well, there is a final
possibility, and that is for the subject to accept without
quibbling the revelation provided by another entity that is
not necessarily connected with the subject’s experience but
that the subject accepts by definition or as a working
hypothesis. We can regard this entity outside the subject as
coming from an individual or collective tradition, be it
called superstition, conviction, deity, or simply belief.
Understanding arrived at through belief is accepted as such
because of where it comes from. And that’s it. This third
method, the revealed method, has no limit, of course.
Everything can ultimately be known by this simple method
of blind belief. The question of knowing is reduced to a
question of will. This third method now covers all the
alternatives of any cognitive process; where intelligibility
cannot go, intuition can, and where intuition cannot go,
belief can. The delicate problem is to intuit when it is still
possible to understand, or to believe when it is still possible
to intuit. It is as absurd to invent for oneself a god of rain
when one already understands the physics of meteorology
as it is to attempt to substitute a love poem with a possible
psycho-biochemical-mathematical-psychological equation
of loving passion.
Pure knowledge does not exist because, among other
things, the scientific method is useful for working on ideas
but not for capturing them. It is not possible to do science
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without intuition, nor is it possible to intuit without having,
at least temporarily, some belief at the outset. The great-
ness of science is that it is possible to understand without
needing to intuit, and the greatness of art is that it is pos-
sible to intuit without needing to understand. The only
acceptable priority between science, art, and revelation
stems solely from the complexity of the slice of the real
world that one is attempting to understand.
In a recent article science is defined as any knowledge
obtained following the scientific method, where the latter is
suggested to be unique (Wagensberg 2014b). Here are
some key concepts redefined in this text: ‘‘observation,’’ ‘‘a
discipline of knowledge,’’ and ‘‘the comprehension of a
slice of reality.’’ Let us say now, then, that three coeffi-
cients between zero and one—lc, la, lr—weight the
degree of science, art, or revelation of any piece of
knowledge and that they now represent the so many per
one of each of the three possible components.
In order to visualize this idea we can introduce here a
logic of fuzzy sets (Zadeh 1965) in the sense that elements
do not belong or stop belonging to a particular class but
that they belong to all of them, with a particular weight.
That is to say, every discipline of knowledge C is the
weighted combination of the three alternatives:
C ¼ lcCc þ laCa þ lrCr with ð4Þ
lc þ la þ lr ¼ 1 where ð5Þ
0 lc 1; 0 la 1; 0 lr  1: ð6Þ
Accordingly, every discipline of knowledge admits this
expression in which the three scientific, artistic, and
revealed qualities (c, a, and r) and the three quantities (lc,
la, lr) with which they each contribute all operate. The
entropy of knowledge is here a measure of how pure
qualities are quantitatively distributed in each real case:
S ¼ lc lg2 lc  la lg2 la  lr lg2 lr bits=quality ð7Þ
However, the triple
lc; la; lr½  ð8Þ
gives quite a precise idea of how qualities are distributed.
If, for example, one is dealing with political knowledge, a
triple (0.2, 0.1, 0.7) would point more to a dictatorship or a
theocracy, whereas (0.6, 0.2, 0.2) would be closer to a state
of law or a democracy. The same could also be done with
the art of Picasso or Borges, which would prove highly
scientific in comparison with the art of Van Gogh or
Marcel Proust, which would be less scientific though no
less great artistically speaking.
Any knowledge about any slice of reality has three
defining characteristics: the degree of complexity of its
content; the method used to understand this content; and
the language in which it is all expressed. The first two, as
we have seen, are not entirely independent of each other.
When the degree of complexity rises, the method shifts
from the scientific to the artistic and from the artistic to the
revealed. Language, however, should be added to the triple
(8) as a fourth dimension that gives, for example, an idea of
the strength of this language, such as through the degree of
mathematization that it admits. It can also be represented
by a coefficient between zero and one, let us say ll with l of
language (the completely descriptive minimum, the maxi-
mum of great mathematical force). In other words:
lc; la; lr; ll
  ð9Þ
in which the first three coefficients indicate the type of
interdisciplinarity of the methods and the fourth the degree
of mathematization of the language.
It is curious to note that in science it is the complexity of
the content that draws on the language, whereas in art it is
the language that draws on the content. For example,
nobody finds it disturbing that Einstein revolutionized
physics with the theory of special relativity using classical
and familiar mathematical language (although he indeed
used new mathematics in order to develop the theory of
general relativity). However, no composer working today
in the 21st century would dare to present a contemporary
musical score written in the language of harmony of
Pergolesi.
Comparing quantities is an objective and exacting
operation thanks to the relations of order since these define
the greater, equal, or smaller with total rigor. However,
when we are talking about qualities, we do not have
something similar with the concepts better, equal, or
worse. Our treatment of quality does not refer to values of
goodness but to values of diversity. It is the quality referred
to the idea of the class of equivalence and diversity, not the
degree of excellence. For this, one would have to give a
scale of values that would necessarily be subjective and
difficult to agree on. However, given a piece of knowledge
we can now, with the suggested theoretical approach,
define four relevant ideas to be borne in mind in any cul-
tural management practice and with which we can begin a
discussion. These are described in the final section by way
of conclusions.
Quantity and Quality of Content and Audiences
Consider a piece of knowledge that provides understanding
of a slice of reality. In every piece of knowledge it is
possible to discern two major concepts: the content (linked
to the object of knowledge) and audiences (linked to the
subject of knowledge). It is possible to talk of both quantity
and quality for each of them.
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1. The quality of the content of knowledge (QLC) can be
simply represented by the quadruple defined in (9) or
by what we term the Shannon entropy of knowledge
(7) qualified by the coefficient of language ll. Greater
Shannon entropy means greater interdisciplinarity in
this case. Interdisciplinary conversation is appropriate
because we are not all ignorant of the same things. The
more diverse the content as regards the method used,
the greater the potential for this knowledge to create
new knowledge, that is to say, the greater its impor-
tance. We now undoubtedly come to the intuitive idea
that we all have of quality knowledge: that knowledge
through which it is possible to generate subsequent
knowledge.
2. The quantity of the content of knowledge (QNC) can,
moreover, make reference to the generality of its
universality, that is to say, to its degree of universality
or even to the size of reality that the piece of
knowledge in question represents. It is not easy to
give a specific measure here, but we can compare sizes
of different contents. For example, the content of the
theory of relativity is bigger than Newtonian mechan-
ics because the latter is contained in the former, and
Hooke’s law on elasticity is smaller than Newtonian
mechanics because the latter contains the former.
Thus, the biology of insects is bigger than that of
mammals both in the number of individuals and in the
number of different species, etc. The larger the size of
the content, the higher the probability of its importance
for the creation of new knowledge.
To put it briefly, the quality of a piece of knowledge is
assessed by the diversity of the methods used to create
it, whereas its quantity is evaluated by the universality
of its applicability.
And we still have two concepts to consider: the
quantity and quality of the audience of the content.
3. The quality of the audience for a piece of knowledge
(QLA) is perfectly measured by Shannon entropy (3) if
we first define n relevant classes of equivalence into
which it is appropriate to classify the individuals in the
audience of the knowledge in question (readers of a
book, spectators at a performance, visitors to a
museum, pupils for a course, etc.). It is possible to
discuss the criteria in each case for the classes of order
(age, educational background, financial status, etc.) or
for the classes of equivalence (nationalities, profes-
sions, interests, religious beliefs, etc.). Shannon
entropy, then, measures (7) the diversity of the
audience distributed among these classes. The defini-
tion of the classes of equivalence is fundamental here
and the ideal criterion in each case must be found.
4. The quantity of the audience for a piece of knowledge
(QNA) is measured using trivial indicators such as the
number of consumers (readers, spectators, visitors,
etc.). However, these quantities give no idea of the
importance of the content to the audience, in other
words, they contain no nuance concerning either the
part of the audience that has benefited from them or the
extent of that benefit. The monument that receives the
most visitors anywhere on the planet is undoubtedly
the Eiffel Tower in Paris (seven million people visit it
each year), yet the visit does not change people’s lives
that much. This brings us to a parameter that is difficult
to evaluate but which would be much more important
when it comes to evaluating both the quantity and the
quality of a cultural offering: the change brought about
by the consumption of a particular cultural product.
For example, and to put it metaphorically, the kilos of
conversation caused among the audience.
Conclusions
For the economy to function, it seems that something has to
be growing. The indicators that show everything is going
well talk of increases: higher wages, more energy, more
transport, more food, more water, more information, more
shops, more culture, and so on. That is the logic of quan-
tities, of the little and lots. We compare quantities to assess
whether we are shrinking or growing. But how do we
compare qualities to determine whether we are doing better
or worse? Curiously, the Spanish language is the only one
that splits the Latin term qualitas qualitatis to make
another two: cualidad (the set of properties and charac-
teristics of things) and calidad (the result of the comparison
of qualities). The first of these can still be quantified. The
homogeneous consists of a single cualidad (one basket
containing ten apples); the heterogeneous of various dif-
ferently filled cualidades (one basket containing two
oranges, three apples, and five bananas). There are degrees
of heterogeneity, from the minimum homogeneity to the
maximum (one basket containing ten different fruits). It is,
as we have seen, a question of a magnitude called Shannon
entropy (3), which measures the degree of homogeneity of
certain preassigned cualidades. It is, let us say, the quantity
of quality. In fact, what entropy actually measures is not so
much the quantity of quality but rather the diversity of
quality.
Let us turn to culture. What are we referring to when we
say that culture is growing? There is the idea that the best
springboard for success is a bit of that selfsame success,
though this may not be entirely admissible at the outset. It
is somewhat like the whitewashing of success that feeds
back into itself to a certain saturation level. This is the
undoubted effect of the publication of what we call ‘‘best-
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seller lists.’’ In the case of non-fiction books, the top places
are filled with self-help books that may be very good if they
are cookery books but very bad when they deal with other
questions to do with the reader’s happiness. A similar trick
is commonly used every year when the number of visitors
to various museums is calculated and reported. The most
usual ploy is to confuse the visitor with a visit. Simply by
dividing the museum into two parts (permanent collection
and temporary display, for example), each visitor is auto-
matically doubled into two visits. In order words, by vir-
tually dividing the content of the museum by n, we trivially
multiply its audience by the same factor. Some museums,
which cannot bear to go without an annual increase, have
managed to accumulate a number of visitors that, if they
were real visitors, would only be possible, given the
museums’ square footage and their opening times, if these
people were to turn up in hordes, piled nine high. Just one
number is insufficient to convey cultural merit, and the
tyranny of this single number indubitably reduces the
quality of any cultural offer.
The issue of how to evaluate each year the quality and
quantity of contents and audiences is returned to over and
over at almost every international gathering concerning
museums. There are many ways of conducting this
appraisal, yet none of them is simple. One way is to
measure the quantity of conversation generated by the visit
and to do so at different characteristic times: (1) conver-
sation between visitors during the visit; (2) conversation
during the first family meal after the visit; (3) conversation
during the month following the visit… How these evalu-
ations should be done objectively is another issue. It is not
easy, but nor is it impossible. Another way is to use an
individual’s first visit to arrange two or three telephone
interviews to attempt to verify whether the visit has
changed any of his habits. Such interviews would be con-
ducted at different times. For example, the first would be
held a month after the visit (1), the second six months after
(2), and the third a year after (3). The questions asked
would be along the lines of: Have you traveled somewhere
new? How did you travel? What books have you read since
then? Has there been any change in your habits or inter-
ests? In short, it is a matter of evaluating how and to what
degree an exhibition is capable of affecting the visitor’s
cultural activity. In 1993, the la Caixa Foundation Science
Museum (today known as CosmoCaixa) carried out this
kind of interview to evaluate the impact of an exhibition
about the Amazon rainforest (Terradas and Wagensberg
2006). We were extremely surprised to find, among other
things, that two people had changed the subject of their
doctoral theses and another 14 had chosen themes related
to those presented in the exhibition. In every case, the
change had been brought about by the direct stimulus of the
visit.
In general, quantity prevails over quality in every
respect. Consequently, cultural creators and administrators
may get into the bad habit of only looking for quantity
reduced to very banal numbers. As a result, they usually
offer stimuli that, in the end, are destined not to seduce on
behalf of a certain area of knowledge but to be consumed
only as what they are, as stimuli. This occurs when a
dinosaur roars or snorts fire in a museum, or when a writer
sits down to plot a best-selling novel (i.e., a thousand pages
with a secret sect, a prophet and a love interest, an ancient
edifice, hidden treasure, corruption and intrigue, etc.). The
stimulus is always the first phase in any cognitive process
and its purpose is to tip the balance towards doing rather
than not doing. The stimulus is not an end in itself but the
starting point that leads to conversation and comprehen-
sion. But when the recipient of culture ends up wallowing
amid the stimuli, then the cognitive process fails. Intel-
lectual delight reduced to the enjoyment of stimuli can be
quite rightly described as pornography.
We mentioned before the unwritten law that states the
sum of quantity plus quality is a constant–hence the intu-
itive strategy of reducing qualities in order to increase
quantities. Perhaps this is a monumental misunderstanding.
There is another hypothesis to test: quality always ends up
dragging quantity after it. Or to put it another way: in the
long run, quality ends up having an impact on quantity. We
may be surprised to discover that it turns out that this
hypothesis is correct. Or to put it another way: that
designing with a view to achieving quantity, whatever the
impact on quality, is quite simply a huge misunderstanding
that we have taken as being right. In short, we all agree that
we must put an end to elites, but it is not a matter of doing
so by eliminating the members of those elites but by
opening the doors so that those on the outside can join
them. This is perhaps the only way whereby quantity and
quality will not contradict each other but grow harmo-
niously and in tandem.
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